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Neoliberal Meritocracy: How ‘Widening Participation’ to 
Universities in England Reinforces Class Divisions 
 
Chris Cunningham and Colin Samson (University of Essex) 
 
Abstract:  
This essay details the processes through which English universities reinforce existing social class divisions while at the same 
time extending access for populations that had historically been excluded from universities. Practices commonly referred to 
within higher education policy as ‘widening participation’ that purport to show solidarity with previously excluded student 
populations, we argue, function to maintain not diminish inequalities. While the meritocratic ideals underpinning the social 
mobility narrative of widening participation encourage economic and employment aspirations as prime motivations for 
applying and entering university, widening participation has not coincided with meaningful mobility. Through an analysis of 
major shifts in higher education policy, we argue that categorisations of the ‘disadvantaged’ student are manufactured to assist 
universities to fund and legitimate themselves as vehicles of social mobility. In this context, we argue that a precarious 
legitimacy exists because social mobility operates within a wider culture of embedded class privilege, and this is constantly 
managed by state regulatory frameworks which reshape and repurpose universities to fit a neoliberal meritocratic image of the 
larger society and the role of universities within it. Ideas of ‘disadvantage’ service solidarity not with the ‘disadvantaged’ but 
with educational service providers, as they offer a target for the promotion of neoliberal meritocracy. In the course of this, class 
differentials are reinforced by channelling ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘advantaged’ students into different niches of the labour market, 
preserving existing inequalities, and sorting graduates into winners and losers. 
Keywords:  
British universities; neoliberalism; social class; social mobility; solidarity 
 
 
Up until the late 1990s, British universities were largely state 
funded and students were provided with government and 
local authority grants for attendance, expenses and even 
Study Abroad opportunities. Although not immune from 
political and public criticism, universities were widely 
perceived as a public good and traded largely on their 
academic reputations. However, by the time of the Blair 
government, the once cherished and often idiosyncratic 
universities were being configured into a corporatized 
‘sector’, and this was done through drastic changes to their 
financing. This movement began with Margaret Thatcher’s 
policies in the late 1980’s to increase competition between 
universities for state funding in the form of block grants. In 
turn, the government promotion of individualised 
economically focused narratives of ‘value for money’ and 
‘consumer choice’ challenged and undermined the collegiate 
culture of universities in ways that were deeply hostile to the 
exploration of free intellectual inquiry as a public good (Hall 
& Jacques, 1983). Indeed, the hegemonic construction of 
economic individualism that guided the privatisation of the 
public sphere assumed that competition and economic gain 
were at the root of human nature (Samson, 1994). This 
ideology posed a radical challenge to the pluralistic and non-
instrumental cultures in British universities. In line with these 
assumptions, government-subsidised university tuition for 
students declined with the introduction of greater 
monetarisation. The aim was to create ‘a much higher level 
of accountability for public funding and greater 
accountability for students as customers’ (Kealey, 2013, as 
cited in Lambert, 2019). Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State 
for Education provided the ‘ideological dynamic for what 
came to be known as Thatcherism’; an ideology that went on 
to influence the neoliberal educational agenda of Tony 
Blair’s New Labour government (Bogdanor, 2013). 
 
Ideas about widening participation came into public 
discourse at the end of the 1990s. At this time, universities 
more aggressively aimed to recruit ‘non-traditional students’, 
meaning those who due to class background, family situation 
or age had not been able to either consider university 
education or meet the academic entry requirements. While 
this was ostensibly an attempt by the British state to show 
solidarity with populations which the class system had 
consigned to almost permanent subjugation, it did this by 
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marketizing their access to universities. Following the 
Dearing Report of the National Committee of Enquiry into 
Higher Education in 1997, tuition fees for home students 
studying at UK universities were introduced, and the 
expansion in university participation reconfigured through 
changing the ways higher education in England was funded. 
The wheels of a new loan system were set in motion, whereby 
the student would enter into an ‘obligation to make 
contributions to the cost of their higher education once they 
are in work’ (Dearing, 1997, p.2). Widening participation as 
a policy directive was overseen by the regulator the Higher 
Education Funding Council England (HEFCE), and later, the 
Office For Fair Access (OFFA), which was established in 
2006. The emphasis on Fair Access promoted an expectation 
of individual economic success following from a university 
degree; a narrative central in Dearing’s Report 9 years earlier. 
 
The ‘obligations’ that students were entering into 
following Dearing were essentially business transactions 
through which the government could create a market of 
financially self-sustaining institutions that trained workers, 
and were depicted to reward the student, and the nation, with 
economic security. The market model redirected the costs of 
universities away from the state and onto the individual 
student, who through the loan system was committed to 
financing their education through tax returns on future 
earnings. At the end of March 2020, the student loan debt in 
England/UK stood at £140 billion (UK Parliament, 2020), 
and it has been suggested that: 
 
for the average graduate, at no point would the total value 
of their debt decrease. Due to the high rate of interest, the 
debt will keep climbing some years after graduation and 
they would be unlikely to repay that loan for 15 to 20 
years or even longer. At the end of this period, when the 
debt is written off, they would eventually have 
accumulated £164,000 of debt and paid a total of £75,000 
(Baroness Jenkin, 2019). 
 
Higher education was therefore repositioned from a 
publicly financed collective good with broad educational and 
intellectual aims for a smaller student body to a commodity 
sold within a distinct economic ‘sector’ to a widened 
population. As we shall see, it was intended to be purchased 




As public funding of universities was being gradually 
withdrawn following the Dearing Report, higher education 
policy in England introduced a standardised classification of 
‘disadvantage’ for the purposes of student recruitment and a 
homogenised group of ‘disadvantaged students’ (OfS, 2019) 
was constructed. The broad and varied range of indicators for 
the ‘underrepresented groups’ that were considered 
disadvantaged included: students from lower household 
income and/or lower socioeconomic status groups; Black, 
Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME); Mature students; 
Disabled students; Care leavers; Carers; People estranged 
from their families; people from Gypsy, Roma and Traveller 
communities; Refugees; Children of military families (OfS, 
2020, p.16). Students in these categories would offer 
universities a steady flow of income from new student loan 
schemes. By the time of the Browne Report of 2010 when the 
university regulator enabled institutions to raise the cap on 
tuition fees to £9,000 a year, a transactional relationship 
between student consumers and university service providers 
had been cemented, and university cultures changed 
accordingly.  
 
In a dizzying series of regulatory alterations to steer 
universities away from broad academic and intellectual 
missions and towards a transactional culture, in 2018 HEFCE 
and OFFA were merged under a new umbrella organisation 
called the Office for Students (OfS), following the Higher 
Education and Research Act 2017. Tuition fees for home 
students had by this time risen to £9,250 per year. The OfS, 
continuing with traditions set out in Dearing, which correlate 
widening participation with tuition fees and funding, 
constructs students as economic ‘investors’ in education, and 
institutions as ‘providers of skills’ that can offer an economic 
return. This suggests that ‘disadvantaged students’, through 
their investment, have an enhanced opportunity for upward 
social mobility. Access and Participation Plans, which 
stipulate how institutions aim to widen participation to 
disadvantaged students became a requirement of registration 
with the OfS. In turn, these Plans were required of institutions 
wishing to raise tuition fees to the maximum amount.  
 
Making the raising of tuition fees dependent upon 
widening participation then turned ‘disadvantaged’ students 
into an ever-expandable currency. The range of typologies 
used to categorise ‘disadvantage’ has been continuously in 
flux, mushrooming to such an extent that many English 
universities now have a vast majority of their student body 
being considered ‘disadvantaged’. These students are often 
identified through the POLAR quintile system, which 
compares rates of higher education participation in different 
postcodes (OfS, 2019, 2020). In 2020 the Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) reported a record 
number of 18-year olds from ‘the most disadvantaged 
backgrounds’ being accepted into universities across the UK. 
However, this record 28,030 intake, up 8% from the previous 
year (UCAS, 2020), is likely to be an underestimate since it 
only considers ‘disadvantage’ in terms of one indicator – the 
POLAR4 quintile system – and does not take into account of 
the full range of indicators mentioned above. 
 
The Promise of Social Mobility 
 
The allure of mass higher education that is apparent today 
was first catalysed by Tony Blair in his famous Education 
Speech of 1997, when the Prime Minister pledged to give 
access to university to 50% of young people (Coughlan, 
2007). This was an important step in legitimating the 
 
 on_education  Journal for Research and Debate _ISSN 2571-7855 _DOI 10.17899/on_ed.2021.10.8        _vol.4_issue # 10 3 
 
expansion of universities as a vehicle of equal opportunities, 
and thus attacking the widely held image of Britain as a class 
ridden society symbolised in education by its school 
‘streaming’ systems (Willis, 1978) and its grossly unequal 
public and private schools. The image of ‘Cool Britannia’ 
under Blair, instead, was of a neoliberal meritocracy in which 
notions of aspiration, social mobility and equal opportunity 
were all connected to a belief in the benevolence of 
capitalism, while the language of social class became ever 
more attenuated. This representation continued through 
Gordon Brown’s ministry, and onto the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat coalition government, when Conservative 
leader David Cameron coined the term ‘Aspiration Nation’ 
(Littler, 2018). Supporting the meritocracy narrative, in 
2012, a progress report entitled University Challenge: How 
Higher Education Can Advance Social Mobility conducted 
by Labour politician Alan Milburn, acting as an independent 
reviewer, suggested that universities play a crucial role in 
enhancing social mobility and providing an economic good 
to the country within an increasingly knowledge-based 
economy (Milburn, 2012). University Challenge documents 
the successes of Britain’s higher education sector, claiming 
that it was ‘world leading’, and noting its ‘unprecedented 
growth’ over four decades. Conveniently, students 
themselves literally had to buy into the meritocracy by 
paying fees, and this was much harder for those with less 
social and actual capital. However, the student loan system 
enabled these investments in ambition to become an 
achievable reality. 
 
The promise of social mobility has since become a 
powerful driver of increased university enrolments. 
University outreach activities have worked to facilitate the 
promise alongside multi-agency initiatives promoting ideas 
of aspiration and opportunity and linking these firmly with 
the completion of a higher education degree. To reaffirm 
linkages between education and economic success, the OfS 
National Collaborative Outreach Programme, recently 
renamed Uni Connect, today operates partnerships between 
schools, colleges, and institutions of higher education with 
the aim of supporting ‘disadvantaged’ or non-traditional 
students, helping them to transition to higher education. The 
website of Uni Connect (OfS, 2021), and subsequent regional 
partnerships depict education in terms of an economic return 
on investment.  
 
To enable a greater number of students to enrol at 
universities, rules around entry level requirements have been 
relaxed for students coming from ‘disadvantaged 
backgrounds’ (UCAS, 2021a). Referred to as ‘contextual 
admissions’, institutions were given added autonomy to 
reduce entry requirements and offer extra consideration to 
applicants based on ambiguous factors, such as ‘if money is 
tight at home’, under the guise of fairness (UCAS, 2021a). 
For universities keen to increase the number of fee-paying 
students, this procedure allowed institutions to admit 
virtually any applicant, especially given the lifting of the 
temporary student number cap in 2020 (McIntyre, 2020).  
 
However, university admission of ‘disadvantaged 
students’ alone is not sufficient to make such students think 
they are on the path to economic success and social mobility; 
they must also believe that they are succeeding in academic 
terms. Therefore, the marks of students have been 
gerrymandered upwards to meet growing expectations 
(Lambert, 2019) prompted by institutional aims to ‘raise 
aspirations’ as detailed in their Access and Participation 
Plans submitted to the OfS to demonstrate commitment to 
widening participation. It is no surprise that the number of 
students receiving a first-class degree has risen considerably; 
from 16% in 2010/11 to 27% in 2016/17, meaning almost 
one-third of students in the country are ‘first class’.  
 
The Legitimacy Crisis 
 
Despite the inculcation of economic aspiration among young 
people, marked increases in first class degrees, and 
burgeoning university enrolments, government goals of 
‘advancing social mobility’ (Milburn, 2012) remain unmet. 
Consecutive reports from the Social Mobility Commission 
demonstrate that while there are ‘more disadvantaged pupils 
staying in education for longer, more disadvantaged students 
going into higher education’, there is also ‘a greater chance 
of disadvantaged young people getting stuck in low paid 
jobs’ (Social Mobility Commission, 2020, p.6). A 2017 
report from the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
Development (CIPD) found that just under half of graduates 
were working in graduate level employment 6 months after 
leaving higher education (CIPD, 2017). This suggests that the 
exchange of tuition fees for an economically rewarding 
career is to a large extent immaterial, rendering the 
transactional model of English higher education barely 
credible. Furthermore, the 2019 report Elitist Britain by the 
Social Mobility Commission in collaboration with the Sutton 
Trust, detailed entrenched class stratification, made up of 
networks that connect private schools, high ranking 
universities, and powerful positions within society (Sutton 
Trust & Social Mobility Commission, 2019). Neoliberal 
meritocracy, it would seem, merely ratifies existing class 
privilege and elite entitlement. It does this, in-part, by 
reframing the education narrative: humanities based 
education which encourages critical thinking in celebration 
of knowledge for its own sake, is redirected away from the 
lower class ‘disadvantaged’ students, and replaced with skills 
based functional training that serves an instrumental purpose 
of channelling workers into the labour market.  
 
The implausibility of the social mobility narrative within 
what is still a massively unequal society was underlined in 
UN Special Rapporteur for Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights Philip Alston’s (United Nations, 2018) report on the 
human rights implications of UK austerity policies. Alston’s 
report, substantiated by over 300 submissions, depicted 
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Britain’s poor as including up to almost fifty percent of 
children in the country and called social welfare, ‘punitive, 
mean-spirited and often callous,’ noting also large cuts in 
public funding for schools, that disproportionately affects 
Britain’s burgeoning numbers of poor people. The 
coexistence of austerity and dubious appeals to social 
mobility could easily lead to a legitimacy crisis. One way to 
avert this problem has been to reshape universities by 
reinforcing the hierarchies between them. 
 
Access and Participation Plans agreed with OfS, which 
allow universities to charge maximum fees, require a 
commitment to widening participation for disadvantaged 
students. Yet, this commitment is unequally shared by 
universities. One of the key recommendations of the Sutton 
Trust and the Social Mobility Commission report (2019) is 
that ‘selective’ universities that are in far less need of state 
funding, such as the Oxbridge colleges, do more to increase 
access for ‘disadvantaged’ students. At the same time 
however, pressure was being applied to the ‘sector’ itself, as 
interior ministers of the Johnson administration worked to 
reinforce the framing of education in narrowly economic 
terms. In July 2020, speaking at an event aiming to widen 
participation to higher education, Universities Minister 
Michele Donelan announced that by promising social 
mobility through education, universities were ‘taking 
advantage’ of students (Donelan, 2020). This sentiment was 
reiterated a week later by Education Secretary Gavin 
Williamson, whose speech on Further Education centred on 
encouraging students to study subjects that would offer 
‘skills to get a good and meaningful job’ (Williamson, 2020). 
Neither of them mentioned the vast inequalities between 
England’s universities or the huge discrepancies in the 
starting points of ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘advantaged’ students. 
 
Comments such as these from current government 
ministers also illustrate a conveniently vapid notion of what 
social mobility is. Without any meaningful articulation of 
what social mobility might mean, the transactional model of 
education pursued by Donelan and Williamson simply 
preserves rather than reduces inequality by encouraging the 
channelling of different categories of students into specific 
careers, and thereby limiting the possibility for genuine 
social mobility. Students graduating from private secondary 
schools are not encouraged to study vocational courses at 
Further Education colleges in the same way as the ‘forgotten 
50%’ that Williamson claimed to ‘stand up for’ in his speech 
in July 2020, which correlated Further Education with 
‘levelling up’ the nation (Williamson, 2020). Meanwhile, 
social capital operating through ‘old-boy networks’ 
connecting elite public schools with high status professions 
and areas of business, works to ensure that powerful positions 
in Britain remain preserved for a select few and can be 
handed down to following generations (Watters, 2016). 
 
One symptom of a legitimacy crisis triggered by 
scepticism towards neoliberal meritocracy is evident in the 
new pressures to reduce tuition fees. In January 2021 a 
petition for a debate in Parliament calling for a dramatic 
reduction of university student tuition fees from £9,250 to 
£3,000 gathered pace. Although the debate about student 
tuition fees has been ongoing since the implementation of 
fees, the impact of the pandemic on what university 
marketing departments and the OfS call ‘the university 
experience’ and the job prospects of graduates has given it 
renewed energy. Towards the end of January 2021, the 
petition stood at over 570,000 signatures (UK Government 
and Parliament, 2021a).  
 
Similarly, the impact arising from the pandemic upon the 
learning experiences of international students brings further 
questions about the true value of tuition fees. The majority of 
international students pay much higher fees than home 
students, with prices differing depending upon the institution 
or the course taken; on average, tuition fees range from 
£18,000 to £29,000 each year (Fazackerley, 2021). Another 
petition to Parliament, calling for tuition fee compensation 
for international students in UK universities, stood at around 
30,000 signatures in mid-March 2021, with 25,000 of these 
being signed within the first week (Fazackerley, 2021). 
However, while the petition for home students calls for a 
reduction in fees, thereby positioning the institutions of 
higher education as being responsible for cost, the petition 
for international students calls on the UK Government for 
compensation, in recognition that ‘many universities cannot 
afford to refund these students’ (UK Government and 
Parliament, 2021b). 
 
Tuition fees for higher education in England are among 
the highest in the world (Augar, 2019), and with the value of 
outstanding loans in UK/England standing at well over £140 
billion (UK Parliament, 2020), this national debt adds further 
pressure to the debate; yet for many institutions operating as 
they now are in a highly marketized environment, lowering 
fees would be fatal. The financial success of the universities 
literally depends on the debts of students. The role of the OfS 
here in representing the interests of students, broadly 
conceived, is crucial to negotiating this extremely precarious 
legitimacy. 
 
Higher Education as a Reinforcement of Class Society 
 
Contradicting what has been an ideologically crucial 
representation of a link between university participation and 
upward social mobility, the Education Secretary, Gavin 
Williamson (2021), recently asserted that ‘encouraging more 
and more students onto courses…serves only to entrench 
inequality.’ In order to bolster this, Williamson’s (2021) 
statements assumed that there were ‘right choices’ with 
regards to the education which universities should provide. 
Therefore, universities choosing to focus on subjects that 
encourage critical thinking and humanistic values are likely 
to face fines if not delivering on ‘successful graduate 
outcomes’, or worse still, they could even lose their ability to 
 
 on_education  Journal for Research and Debate _ISSN 2571-7855 _DOI 10.17899/on_ed.2021.10.8        _vol.4_issue # 10 5 
 
award degrees (Morgan, 2021). England’s most prestigious 
universities, however, remain to serve as a pipeline for a 
privileged class (Sutton Trust & Social Mobility 
Commission, 2019), and are set to be less bound by OfS 
regulation (Morgan, 2021), and therefore will be free to offer 
these subjects without penalty, while lesser institutions will 
be tasked with training ‘disadvantaged students’ into 
employment pathways that simply validate the inequalities 
present in British society as a whole. Such a move is already 
underway, illustrated by a trend towards specific degree 
schemes connected to labour market domains and many other 
degrees fitted out with compulsory ‘employability modules’ 
that have replaced intellectual content. This coincides with a 
drastic slide in the entry marks needed for applicants 
applying to lower ranking institutions, which often consider 
the ambiguous concept of ‘life experience’ as an alternative 
to having the required grades for entry (UCAS, 2021b). The 
solidarity that was briefly signalled towards excluded student 
populations to benefit from the varied types of knowledge 
imparted and absorbed in universities is now fully exposed 
as a failed method to manage the appearance of inequality. 
Williamson’s admission that university expansion only 
entrenched inequality was simply replaced with a more 
transparent way to entrench it. But these U-turns also 
exposed the fact the government has had no intention of 
having ‘disadvantaged students’ experience social mobility 
and achieve highly skilled employment. This was underlined 
by the introduction of a post Brexit Immigration Bill based 
on a points-based system that prioritises highly skilled 
migrants (Home Office, 2020). Ambitions to ‘deliver a 
system that works in the interests of the whole of the UK and 
prioritises the skills a person has to offer, not where they 
come from’ (Home Office, 2020) highlights that government 
aims of increasing social mobility through university 
participation for UK nationals, are either misleading or 
generally recognised as being unrealistic. Plugging gaps in a 
skilled-labour workforce by filling vacancies through 
immigration policies, reinforces class divides not only within 
the UK, but also globally, as workers without points are 
denied access and sending countries are depleted of skilled 
workers.  
 
With neoliberal meritocracy and the social mobility it 
promises transparently implausible, solidarity within the 
‘sector’ becomes reinforced as institutions of higher 
education work to perpetuate the class-based school 
streaming systems of English society. Meanwhile, prospects 
for solidarity of class-based activism are curtailed as the 
hegemonic construction of neoliberal meritocracy, 
implausible as it is, continues to shape educational discourse 
and works to increase competition among students, who 
scramble to grab limited opportunities. Whether 
Williamson’s watered-down visions of ‘success’ for the 
‘disadvantaged students’ who continue to accumulate large 
loan debts will mean anything remains to be seen; yet, it is 
highly likely that whatever the outcome for universities, the 
superficial modification of existing economic and power 
structures will work to ensure that the solidarity of the 






Augar, P. (2019, May). Independent panel report to: Review of post-18 education and funding. GOV.UK. Retrieved January 
15, 2021, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/805127/Review_of_post_18_education_and_funding.pdf  
 
Baroness Jenkin. (2019, July 2). Post-18 education and funding review, Volume 798. Hansard HL: Column 1406. Debated on 




Bogdanor, V. (2013, May 21). Sir Keith Joseph and the market economy. Gresham College. Retrieved January 15, 2021, 
from https://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/sir-keith-joseph-and-the-market-economy 
 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. (2017, November 16). The graduate employment gap: expectations versus 
reality. CIPD. Retrieved February 9, 2021, from https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/work/skills/graduate-
employment-gap-report  
 
Couglan, S. (2007, May 14). Education, education, education. BBC News. Retrieved April 19, 2019, from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/6564933.stm  
 
Dearing Report. (1997). Higher Education in the learning society - main report. The National Committee of Enquiry into 
Higher Education. Retrieved September 20, 2020, from http://www.educationengland.org.uk/ 
documents/dearing1997/dearing1997.html 
 
Donelan, M. (2020, July 1). Universities Minister calls for true social mobility. GOV.UK. Retrieved January 16, 2021, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/universities-minister-calls-for-true-social-mobility 
 
 on_education  Journal for Research and Debate _ISSN 2571-7855 _DOI 10.17899/on_ed.2021.10.8        _vol.4_issue # 10 6 
 
 
Fazackerley, A. (2021, March 13). ‘Treated like cash cows’: international students at top universities withhold £29,000 fees. 
The Guardian. Retrieved March 16, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/education/2021/mar/13/treated-like-
cash-cows-international-students-at-top-london-universities-withhold-29000-fees 
 
Hall, S., & Jacques, M. (Eds.). (1983). The Politics of Thatcherism. Lawrence & Wishart Ltd. 
 
Home Office. (2020, February 19). The UK’s points-based immigration system: policy statement. GOV.UK. Retrieved March 
2, 2021, from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-policy-
statement/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-policy-statement  
 
Lambert, H. (2019, August 21). The great university con: how the British degree lost its value. The New Statesman. 
Retrieved February 22, 2021, from https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/education/2019/08/great-university-con-
how-british-degree-lost-its-value 
 
Littler, J. (2018). Against Meritocracy, Routledge. 
 
McIntyre, F. (2020, August 17). Department for Education abandons student number cap. *Research Professional News. 
Retrieved February 21, 2021, from https://researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-he-government-education-2020-8-
department-for-education-scraps-student-number-cap/  
 
Milburn, A. (2012, October). Foreword and summary. In University Challenge: How Higher Education Can Advance Social 
Mobility. Retrieved April 19, 2019, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/80188/Higher-Education.pdf 
 
Morgan, J. (2021, February 2). OfS Chair pick will keep Tory whip but ‘uphold independence’. Times Higher Education. 
Retrieved February 6, 2021, from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/ofs-chair-pick-will-keep-tory-whip-
uphold-independence 
 
Office for Students. (2019). English higher education 2019: The Office for Students annual review. OfS. Retrieved January 
15, 2021, from https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/annual-review-2019/#access.  
 




Office for Students. (2021). Uni Connect. OfS. Retrieved January 16, 2021, from https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/ 
advice-and-guidance/promoting-equal-opportunities/uni-connect/  
 
Samson, C. (1994). The three faces of privatisation. Sociology, 27(1), 79–97. 
Social Mobility Commission. (2020, June). Monitoring social mobility 2012–2020: Is the government delivering on our 
recommendations? GOV.UK. Retrieved January 16, 2021, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/891155/Monitoring_report_2013-2020_-Web_version.pdf  
 
Sutton Trust & Social Mobility Commission. (2019). Elitist Britain 2019. The educational backgrounds of Britain’s leading 
people. GOV.UK. Retrieved January 16, 2021, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/811045/Elitist_Britain_2019.pdf  
 
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service. (2020, September 24). More students from the most disadvantaged 




Universities and Colleges Admissions Service. (2021a). What is Contextual Admissions. UCAS. Retrieved February 21, 
2021, from https://www.ucas.com/connect/blogs/what-contextual-admissions  
 
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service. (2021b). UCAS undergraduate entry requirements. UCAS. Retrieved March 
20, 2021, from https://www.ucas.com/undergraduate/what-and-where-study/ucas-undergraduate-entry-requirements  
 
UK Government and Parliament. (2021a). Petition: reduce university tuition fees from £9,250 to £3,000. Petitions: UK 
Government and Parliament. Retrieved January 15, 2021, from https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/550344. 
 
 
 on_education  Journal for Research and Debate _ISSN 2571-7855 _DOI 10.17899/on_ed.2021.10.8        _vol.4_issue # 10 7 
 
UK Government and Parliament. (2021b). Petition: tuition fee compensation for international students in UK universities. 
UK Government and Parliament. Retrieved March 16, 2021, from https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/572202 
 




United Nations, Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner. (2018, November 16). Statement on visit to the United 
Kingdom, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights. 
Retrieved April 15, 2021, from https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/EOM_GB_16Nov2018.pdf 
 
Watters, S. (2016). Old boy networks: The relationship between elite schooling, social capital, and positions of power in 
British society. In A. Koh, & J. Kenway (Eds.). Elite schools: Multiple geographies of privilege. Education in global 
context (pp. 101–121). Routledge.  
 
Williamson, G. (2020, July 9). Education Secretary FE speech with Social Market Foundation. GOV.UK. Retrieved January 
16, 2021, from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/education-secretary-fe-speech-with-social-market-
foundation  
  
Williamson, G. (2021, February). Guidance to the Office for Students (OfS) – Secretary of State’s strategic priorities. OfS. 
Retrieved February 9, 2021, from https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/media/48277145-4cf3-497f-b9b7-
b13fdf16f46b/ofs-strategic-guidance-20210208.pdf 
 





Cunningham, C., & Samson, C. (2021). Neoliberal meritocracy: How ‘widening participation’ to universities in England 
reinforces class divisions. On Education. Journal for Research and Debate, 4(10). 
https://doi.org/10.17899/on_ed.2021.10.8 
 
About the Authors 
 
Chris Cunningham is a PhD candidate of the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex. As an emerging scholar 
within the field of ‘critical social mobility studies’, his thesis questions: what is the purpose of a university? Research interests 
include: the marketisation of higher education; the British class system; identity politics; knowledge creation power relations.  
Living a transient lifestyle from youth and working in a variety of occupational settings, Chris entered university in 2007 
employed as a security guard. In 2013 he returned to education as a mature student and continues to work a number of different 
job roles alongside his studies and being a parent to three children. 
 
For most of his career, Colin Samson has researched and been an advocate for the rights of indigenous peoples. He has worked 
with the Innu in northern Canada and also with Arapaho and Shoshone people at the Wind River Reservation in the US while 
he was a Visiting Professor of American Indian Studies at the University of Wyoming in 2015-2016. His latest book, The 
Colonialism of Human Rights: Ongoing Hypocrisy's of Western Liberalism (Polity, 2020) looks at non-universal human rights 
which have been embedded through the colonial process, the persistence of racist thought and manifest in contemporary 
iterations of imperialism. Colin was educated 30 years ago at the University of California at Berkeley and has great admiration 
for public sociology and civic-minded pedagogy. He has been alarmed at the aggressive re-shaping of knowledge to fit 
commercial imperatives that, as his collaboration here with Chris Cunningham argues, has made university participation in 
England an economic transaction that can reinforce class inequality.
 
